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ZINOVIEV: POPULIST LENINIST 
 
 
What we need to do is get to the point where the widest circles of the 
masses of the narod understand that a communist is not someone who 
wears a leather jacket and sneers at everybody (applause). . . . Any 
person in the narod – the most backward little old lady, a toiling 
peasant – who regards us as in league with the devil [even though] 
they haven’t read the party program and are not going to read it, 
they’re not interested in the Third International and we can’t expect 
them to be – in their hearts they are more of a communist than the 
communist in a leather jacket who looks down his nose at them. 
 
                                                                                    Zinoviev, March 1919 
 
The worst thing that can happen to a revolutionary party is to lose its 
[revolutionary] perspective. 
 
                                                                                       Zinoviev, May 1925 
 
In terms of historical reputation, G. E. Zinoviev undoubtedly would have 
the right to repeat the words of the old song: “I’ve been ‘buked and I’ve been 
scorned’.” No one seems to have a kind word for him. Among the many 
charges laid against him is intellectual and political inconsistency. Trotsky 
summed it up in a memorable wisecrack: “Luther said, Here I stand – I can 
do no other. Zinoviev says, Here I stand – but I can do otherwise.”  
Zinoviev was not in the least a systematic thinker who could state a coher-
ent outlook in propositional form. On the other hand, he was an inspirational 
speaker who very often told stories – small anecdotes from daily life, large 
narratives about the revolution as a whole – in order to impress his audience. 
An assessment of the coherence and consistency of his outlook therefore re-
quires a systematic survey of his many speeches during his time in the top 
leadership of the ruling Bolshevik party. 
Using Zinoviev’s speeches as basic material, this essay examines his out-
look as revealed in two interconnected themes: the relationship of the party to 
the working class as a whole, and the battle Zinoviev thought was being 
waged for the soul of the peasantry. I have found a striking and demonstrable 
consistency in Zinoviev’s outlook in the period 1918-1925, manifesting itself 
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in rhetoric, focus of attention, and policy preferences. The transition from so-
called “war communism” to NEP did not lead to any fundamental changes in 
the way Zinoviev presented the basic Bolshevik message. In my view, Zino-
viev’s relatively populist version of Bolshevism has its attractive features.  I 
am thus willing to join the small group of observers with something positive 
to say about Zinoviev (the only others I know in this select group are Anatoly 
Lunacharsky and Myron W. Hedlin).
1
 
I should reassure my readers that I am not going to challenge the general 
impression that Zinoviev was far from vozhd material. On the contrary, my 
investigation has brought home to me his anti-charisma, his tactical errors, 
and his inability to present his views in organized fashion. I am not going to 
argue anything like “if only Zinoviev’s views had been taken seriously. . . .” I 
take it for granted that his solutions to intractable problems were simplistic 
and would not have worked. This simplistic outlook was one reason – but not 
the only one! – for the political ineptitude that was revealed in the Bolshevik 
infighting of the 1920s.
2
 
Two comments by Lunacharsky seem to me to hit the right note: he called 
Zinoviev a “person who had a profound understanding of the essence of Bol-
shevism” and one who was “romantically” devoted to the party.3 I will pre-
sent Zinoviev as someone who was under the spell of the Leninist drama of 
hegemony, but with a decided populist bent. 
Lenin’s drama had three basic characters: the proletarian vanguard, the 
hegemonic rivals, and the wavering classes. The best description of the van-
guard is in Robert Tucker’s classic article “Lenin’s Bolshevism as a Culture 
in the Making.” I will cite Tucker at length in order to give the Leninist con-
text for Zinoviev’s outlook:  
 
To understand Lenin’s political concept in its totality, it is important 
to realize that he saw in his mind’s eye not merely the militant organiza-
tion of professional revolutionaries of which he spoke, but the party-led 
popular movement “of the entire people.” The “dream” was by no means 
simply a party dream although it centered in the party as the vanguard of 
                                                 
1. Lunacharsky wrote sympathetically about Zinoviev in 1920 (reprinted in Lunacharskii, 
Radek and Trotskii, Siluety: politicheskie portrety [Moscow: Gosizdat, 1991]). Myron Hedlin 
wrote two excellent articles on Zinoviev that appeared in the 1970s: “Grigorii Zinoviev: Myths 
of the Defeated,” in Reconsideration on the Russian Revolution, ed. Ralph Carter Elwood (Co-
lumbus, OH: Slavica, 1976) and “Zinoviev’s Revolutionary Tactics in 1917,” Slavic Review 34 
(1975): 19-43.  
2. For a recent discussion of Zinoviev’s weakness as a political leader, see Alexis Pogorel-
skin, “Kamenev in Early NEP: The 12 Party Congress,” in Rude and Barbarous Kingdom Revis-
ited: Essays in Honor of Robert O. Crummey (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2008). 
3. Siluety, pp. 296, 298. 
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conscious revolutionaries acting as teachers and organizers of a much 
larger mass following in the movement. The dream was a vision of an 
anti-state popular Russia raised up by propaganda and agitation as a vast 
army of fighters against the official Russia headed by the tsar; and of this 
other, popular Russia as an all-class counter-community of the estranged, 
a mass of people trained to revolutionary consciousness by its party tu-
tors and dedicated to the goal of a revolution that would rid Russia of its 
“shame and curse,” as Lenin called the autocracy.4  
. 
To get the full dramatic structure of Lenin’s outlook, we need to introduce 
two other characters. The first is the petty bourgeois with his or her “two 
souls,” one leading toward proletarian socialism and the other toward capital-
ism; the conflict between these tendencies produces the key feature of the 
petty bourgeois, namely, wavering (kolebanie). The other character is the 
hegemonic rival, the alternative leadership trying to lead the waverers down 
the wrong path.  
The word “populist” is used here in its American sense: someone who has 
genuine concern for the problems of ordinary people, who has a simplistic 
tendency to blame those problems on the machinations of elites, and who 
sees full democratization as the ultimate solution to all issues. We shall ex-
amine Zinoviev’s message on three levels: the overall historical narrative or 
background story, the implied definition of specific stages of the Russian 
revolution, and the policy recommendations that flowed from his definition 
of the situation. 
 
Party and class 
Civil War (1919-1921) 
We should start with Zinoviev’s background story: what he thought was 
the natural course of events, the way things should go without disturbances, 
the story created by deep historical forces. According to this story, the party 
was in the vanguard not so much in the sense of a permanent officer corps but 
in the strict sense that it was the first to go where the rest of the working class 
would soon be going. Zinoviev assumed that the influence of the party would 
be steadily growing and that the proletarians and semi-proletarians who 
didn’t join today would be joining tomorrow. A category essential to his out-
look – the “nonparty” worker or peasant – could really be labeled as the “not-
yet-party.” At any one time, the bourgeoisie might have influence over a cer-
tain portion of the masses, but all in all there will be a steady movement away 
from bourgeois influence. This fundamental assumption is set out in a resolu-
                                                 
4. Robert C. Tucker, Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia (New York: Norton, 
1987), p. 39. 
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tion Zinoviev drafted for the Comintern in 1920 that he often referred back to 
later with pride: 
  
Before the conquest of power and during the transition period, the 
Communist Party – given favorable circumstances – can make use of an 
undivided ideological and political influence on all proletarian and semi-
proletarian strata of the population, but it cannot unite them organiza-
tionally in its own ranks. Only after the dictatorship of the proletariat has 
deprived the bourgeoisie of such mighty tools of influence as the press, 
the schools, parliament, the church, administrative machinery and so on 
– only after the decisive defeat of the bourgeois system has become evi-
dent to all – will all or almost all workers begin to join the ranks of the 
Communist party.
5
   
 
Just as the party is the most coherent organizational expression of basic 
class interests, so the party program is just a more sophisticated expression of 
class instinct. It was good for the party to spend time on its program in 1919, 
because each party member “wants to have his own view on things, he wants 
to know how our world came to be, he needs an integral and thought-out 
world-view.”6 But knowledge of the program should not be a necessity for 
participation in the soviet system. Zinoviev wanted VTsIK to have fewer 
commissars and more representatives of the people: “Let peasants come to us 
from somewhere out on the Volga or from the Ukraine and other places – 
peasants who do not yet grasp all the inner secrets of communism, who know 
only the basics, that they are against the rich, that the land should belong to 
the peasants and not the pomeshchik, and so on.”7 
As the last citation shows, Zinoviev’s background story led to an optimism 
that made him always come down on the side of expanding membership of 
the party and “enlisting” (privlekat’) “nonparty elements” into the soviets.  
He assured his party audience that expansion would not mean that “our party 
dissolves into fragments and stops consisting of a single whole.”8 
The party’s expanding influence did not manifest itself primarily in pas-
sive assent but in active participation in government. This participation prom-
ised benefits for both state and population. For the population, it ultimately 
offered a cheap and transparent state apparatus: one of the key promises of 
                                                 
5. Text taken from Zinoviev’s self-quotation in 1924; see Trinadtsatyi s”ezd RKP(b): Steno-
graficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1963) (Zinoviev’s emphasis). 
6. Grigorii Zinoviev, “Ob itogakh VIII s’’ezda RKP(b),” Izvestiia TsK, no. 8 (1989), pp. 187-
91 (remarks of March 29, 1919 to a meeting of party aktiv in Petrograd). 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid., pp. 196-97. 
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the revolution. For the state, it offered the only long-term solution to ineffi-
ciency and bureaucratism. Thus the end result of the party’s steadily expand-
ing influence would be not only a party that embraced the entire working 
class, but the commune-state (gosudarstvo-kommuna). 
We now turn to Zinoviev’s analysis of what Mary McAuley has labeled 
“the wall”: the barrier that seemed inevitably to grow up between the van-
guard party and its constituency, much to the distress of the former.
9
 Zino-
viev himself used this imagery when he stated that even some party collec-
tives in Petrograd “have been able to fence themselves off from the masses 
with a wall.”10 The wall also grew up within the party itself, leading to the 
1920 crisis of the “lower-downs vs. the higher-ups” [nizy i verkhi]. 
Zinoviev’s analysis of the wall cannot be understood without keeping in 
mind the background story I have just discussed. The wall was a betrayal of 
the vanguard’s mission of leadership, so that “people look on these [party] 
collectives as the people running things [nachal’stvo] rather than looking on 
them as the advanced people.”11 Thus the expectations that arise from this 
story are what prompt Zinoviev’s concern with the wall; they also form the 
basis of most of his solutions.  
Based on work he had done before the war, Zinoviev had a ready-made 
and detailed model of the dangers of the wall in the German SDP.
12
 He inter-
preted the SPD as an originally revolutionary party that unbeknownst to itself 
had allowed the leadership stratum to become a closed caste. The result was 
degeneration (pererozhdenie) of the party organism. This was a warning to 
the Communist party, which should not simply feel superior to other parties 
and ignore “the beam in its own eye.” There was a definite possibility that it 
too would end up dominated by a “stratum of state-employed intellectuals, 
soviet chinovniki, soviet and party bureaucrats.”13  
Of course, Zinoviev denied that the wall was inherent in the soviet system 
as such (witness his speech at the 8
th
 Congress of Soviets in 1920), but he did 
analyze some of the deeper causes of the phenomenon. (In reading over Zi-
noviev’s analysis of the situation in 1919 and 1920, keep in mind the stand-
ard stereotype according to which the Bolsheviks were then in the grip of an 
                                                 
9. Mary McAuley, Bread and Justice: State and Society in Petrograd, 1917-1922 (Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1991), p. 402. The last two chapters of the book and McAuley’s conclusion 
contain an insightful analysis of the phenomenon of the wall.  For a discussion of differing Bol-
shevik responses to the wall in 1920, see Lars T. Lih, “Vlast from the Past,” Left History, 6, no. 2 
(1999): 29-52. 
10. Vos’moi s”ezd RKP(b): Protokoly (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1959), p. 294. 
11. Ibid. 
12. See Zinoviev, “The Social Roots of Opportunism,” in John Riddell, ed., Lenin’s Struggle 
for a Revolutionary International (New York: Monad Press, 1984), pp. 476-95. 
13. Vos’moi s”ezd RKP(b), pp. 279-80.  
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euphoric ideology of “war communism” that led them to believe that social-
ism was just around the corner.) 
One set of reasons arose from the fundamental fact that the party was now 
in power and had the responsibility of administering a vast state. If you were 
in your office administering a department, or off on a komandirovka in the 
provinces, you were physically unable to maintain a living link with the 
workers in the factory. 
Another set of reasons was the sacrifices caused by the war and the 
razrukha. What kind of communist paradise could there be if Russia had to 
be looted in order to serve the front?
14
 No wonder that political life in the so-
viets died away. Poverty led to strict prioritizing and this is turn was the un-
derlying reason for glavkokratiia (rule by glavki, the boards that ran the high-
ly centralized industrial sector). The party also had to be on a war footing, 
with strict centralization, which meant that practices such as naznachenstvo 
(appointment from above) and perebroska sil (centralized distribution of 
scarce party forces) had to be tolerated. 
Another war-related factor was the need to deny political freedoms. Zino-
viev affirmed the necessity for this denial, but he leaves the impression that it 
was anomalous and he looked forward to its gradual disappearance.
15
 At the 
8th party congress in 1919, he noted that in practice a much wider group had 
been deprived of electoral rights than the Soviet Constitution itself had man-
dated. The Bolsheviks should strive to extend electoral rights (when circum-
stances permitted) instead of waiting for the Mensheviks and the SRs to get 
the credit.
16
 
Another fundamental reason for the appearance of the wall was the cultur-
al gap between the leadership of the party and the mass membership. This led 
to reliance on spetsy, the so-called “bourgeois specialists” – a reliance that 
was not only bad in itself, but threatened an infectious degeneration on the 
part of the communists who worked with them. Attempts by the workers 
simply to replace the spetsy created chaos in government, as the workers “get 
tangled up in the state apparat in the same way that a child will sometimes 
get tangled up in the coat of his father.”17   
                                                 
14. G. Zinoviev, Na poroge novoi epokhi: kommunisty i bespartiinye (Petrograd: Gosizdat, 
1921) (speech given to non-party conference in April 1921). 
15. It should be recalled that Zinoviev’s dispute with Lenin in October 1917 was fundamen-
tally over the issue of a coalition government, as shown by Myron Redlin, “Zinoviev’s Revolu-
tionary Tactics in 1917.” 
16. Vos’moi s”ezd RKP(b), pp. 290-91. 
17. “Pometki V. I. Lenina v tezisakh G. E. Zinov’eva,” Voprosy Istorii KPSS, no. 6 (1990), 
pp. 30-36. This image is taken from a draft Zinoviev wrote for presentation to the 8th Congress 
of Soviets in late 1920. Lenin was somewhat taken aback by it, writing “??” in the margin. 
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All of these factors together – the need to administer the state, the perma-
nent emergency of war and razrukha, the monopoly of political power, the 
cultural gulf between leaders and followers – meant that too great a burden 
was placed on the thin layer of the party leadership. These leaders were 
spread too thin, bone-tired, and loaded down with an “accumulation of pow-
er” and offices that boded no good.18 
The wall was like a dam that interrupted the otherwise natural flow of 
hearts and minds into the Bolshevik camp. There were bad consequences on 
both sides of the wall. On the leadership side, there were flagrant abuses of 
power and privilege. Among those mentioned by Zinoviev were cases of 
privileged distribution of expropriated goods such as apartments and an 
alarming case of incipient anti-Semitism in his home town of Elizavetgrad.
19
 
On the side of the workers, there was natural and justified anger at these 
abuses. One of the key promises of the revolution had been equality, and 
nothing did the party more harm than indifference and greed on the part of 
the party’s leadership. “People do not realize that they deal a blow to our par-
ty with this sort of thing that no single whiteguard would be able to do.”20  
Even if there were no abuses, the wall led to resentment on the part of 
those left behind: 
  
The worker is jealous, he envies his fellow worker who is a member 
of a soviet, who dresses a little better, who eats a little better, and there-
fore he hates him worse than he earlier hated a burzhui. Yes, the worker 
has this trait. . . . If the worker doesn’t see the one he elected for three 
months, he starts to regard him as part of ‘them’ [chuzhoi] and no longer 
as his representative.”21 
 
All of this led to a situation where alternative leaderships – the Bolshe-
viks’ rivals for hegemony – had a greater chance. Zinoviev gave the example 
of one Federov at the Putilov factory: a “petty crook” that the workers trusted 
more than their own elected representatives, simply because he was always 
there in the factory.
22
  
                                                 
18. Vos’moi s”ezd RKP(b), pp. 279-80. 
19. Zinoviev, “Ob itogakh,” pp. 190, 197. 
20. Ibid., p. 197. 
21. Ibid., p. 195.  This statement may give the impression that Zinoviev was justifying this 
inequality, but at the 9th party conference in September 1920 he discussed these same problems 
(position of a worker elite) at length and made clear that equality was a key value of the revolu-
tion (Deviataia konferentsiia RKP(b): Protokoly [Moscow: Gosizdat, 1972], pp. 145-52). In 
1925, the party majority gave Zinoviev a very hard time when he insisted that equality was a key 
revolutionary value. 
22. Zinoviev, “Ob itogakh,” pp. 194-95.   
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If the main reason for the wall was objective conditions such as the war 
and material poverty, then ultimately the only way to break down the wall 
was to remove those underlying causes: end the war and improve productivi-
ty. At the beginning of 1920, Zinoviev looked forward to steady improve-
ment in the standard of living, but this proved premature, since 1920 turned 
out to be another year of war and sacrifice. In the meantime, the party leaders 
had to be frank about the sacrifices they demanded and show that they real-
ized the cost of victory. 
 Objective difficulties should not excuse inaction. The party’s own incom-
petence – its “lack of skill, sloppiness, lack of culture and carelessness” – had 
greatly contributed to the problem.
23
 The most important thing was to im-
prove the workers’ lot in some minimal way: 
  
Up here in Petrograd, in connection with the recent disturbances, it 
was established that at the Nevsky gate cloth supplies were rotting away, 
while at the same time women workers who needed clothes were driven 
to thievery, for which we persecuted them and created conflict after con-
flict. There’s no greater shame for us than that these supposedly small – 
but in reality not small at all – ”defects of the mechanism” are still 
around, that we still can’t clothe a worker family or the mother of a 
worker, who would appreciate even the smallest improvement of their lot 
or some genuine love and concern for them.
24
   
 
Another basic antidote for degeneration was workerization (orabochenie), 
or bringing the workers (and after them, the toilers in general) into the party 
and the soviets. The accent here is more on the workers’ role in curing the 
party than spreading the party’s influence. Workerization includes bringing 
workers into the party, nonparty toilers into the soviets, and turning Rabkrin 
into a tool for improving the state apparatus. It also meant bringing party 
members closer to the workers: Zinoviev persistently pushed measures to en-
sure that officials be regularly sent back to the floor.
25
 
                                                 
23. See Zinoviev’s speech at Vos’moi s”ezd Sovetov rabochikh, krest’ianskikh, kras-
noarmeiskikh i kazachnykh deputatov (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1921).   
24. Ibid., pp. 283-84. 
25. McAuley comments: “When faced with unrest, one response was to try to bring the gov-
ernment itself, physically, closer to the people; to create an immediate, personal link between 
leaders and led. . . . They repeatedly resorted to this strategy, described as one of restoring ‘links 
with the non-party masses,’ one which had its roots in old party practice (meetings were the 
place for gaining party support) and which fitted with notions of direct democracy, but one 
which was woefully inadequate as a means of connecting government and people” (Bread and 
Justice, p. 426). 
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 In particular, effort should be made to revitalize the soviets and extend 
party influence within them.
26
 The net of enlistment should be thrown wide: 
in Petrograd a somewhat successful effort had been made to enlist “crafts-
men, laundresses, cabbies and lower-level civil servants” in order to free 
them “from the influence and hegemony of the petty and large-scale bour-
geoisie.”27 
The converse of workerization was “re-registrations” or chistki (purges) to 
remove non-proletarian elements – or at least to impose a special check-up 
(proverka) on them. Finally, Zinoviev proposed some specific measures of 
abuse prevention: legal accountability of party members, a crackdown on fa-
voritism and “protectionism,” and wide preliminary discussion of state de-
crees. 
 
NEP (1922-1925) 
We now turn to the early NEP period when Zinoviev was the principal 
spokesman for Bolshevism. The basic story and the analysis of the wall re-
main more or less the same, but updated to take into account the new circum-
stances of peacetime.  
Zinoviev now adds some elaborations to his basic story of expanding in-
fluence. In 1922, he provided more detail to the story prior to the revolution. 
He claimed that in the pre-revolutionary years the party had been able to cre-
ate a “reservoir” of sympathizers who provided the basic core of new mem-
bers after 1917.
28
 In early 1921, the difficulties of the civil war reached their 
height and the party’s relations with the workers reached their low point. In a 
speech given at the time, Zinoviev apologized for the guards at the facto~ 
gates, but asserted that it was the role of the purposive (soznatel’nye) leaders 
to make sure that waverings at a moment of intense strain not lead to disas-
ter.
29
 
                                                 
26. Zinoviev recalled the hopes that had been placed on the soviets in 1917: “the soviets as 
organs in which the creativity of the masses finds for itself the most free and most organized 
path, the soviets as organs that guaranteed a constant stream of fresh forces from below, the so-
viets as organs where the masses learned at one and the same time to legislate and to carry out 
their own laws” (“Pometki V. I. Lenina,” p. 33). “Revitalization of the soviets” became central to 
Zinoviev’s rhetoric in the mid-twenties. 
27. Vosmoi s”ezd, pp. 290-91. 
28. XI s”ezd RKP(b): Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1961), pp. 380-85.   
29. Zinoviev, Na poroge novoi epokhi. Zinoviev was evidently deeply shaken by this epi-
sode; I have found two other references to it, both emphasizing the depth of the alienation be-
tween party and class at this point in time, but also praising the Bolsheviks for remaining true to 
their “historical mission.” See Zinoviev, “Zadachi nashei partii posle konchiny V. I. Lenina: Dva 
doklada,” Krasnaia Nov’, 1924, p. 24 and Zinoviev, Istoriia RKP(b), 4th ed. (Leningrad: Gosiz-
dat, 1924), p. 200. 
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After this low point (Zinoviev continues) things gradually became better. 
Although 1921-1923 were difficult years that allowed a growth in Social 
Democratic influence abroad, they also saw the beginning of economic reviv-
al and the end of the “declassing” of the scattered and demoralized working 
class. The “Lenin enrollment” of 1924 marked the completion of the years of 
recovery and the beginning of a new chapter in the story, one that would end 
with all members of the working class inside the party.   
The role of Cassandra is no longer played by the warning example of the 
SPD’s degeneration, but rather by what Zinoviev calls the “clever foe” 
(umnyi vrag): Russian émigrés who were looking forward to the party’s de-
generation. The clever foe was a basic rhetorical device for Zinoviev: he does 
not just refer to such writers in passing, but gives very extensive citations 
from their articles and indeed often frames his presentation around them. 
Among the émigrés used in this way were Pavel Miliukov, David Dalin, 
Fëdor Dan, Vladimir Nabokov (the father of the novelist), and Nikolai Us-
trialov. It almost seems as if Zinoviev is engaged in an inner polemic with 
these intelligentsia critics.  
The wall that had grown up between party and class still existed, and the 
basic reason was still the clash between the responsibilities of power and the 
party’s self-image as leader of the oppressed. On the one hand, the party 
member was told to “learn to trade,” to work closely with specialists, and to 
accept the need for inequality; on the other hand, he was told to be to a repre-
sentative of the class that was “recently oppressed and which still today is 
economically the most downtrodden.”30 This dilemma was not unique to 
NEP: “The danger of degeneration of the social nucleus is real, we talked 
about this danger in 1919 and in 1921. We are obliged to repeat it, especially 
under NEP, with an even heavier accent.”31 
The economic collapse was thankfully a problem that was gradually reced-
ing into the past: problems such as unemployment remained, but nothing like 
the crises of the recent past.
32
 The revival of the economy presented a new 
challenge: handling the demands for political activity that were sure to come 
both from nonparty elements (to be encouraged) and the new bourgeoisie (to 
be discouraged).
33
 
Zinoviev was adamant that there would be no “political NEP,” that is, no 
legalization of independent political activity. It is still possible to see hints 
                                                 
30. XI s”ezd, pp. 394-95. 
31. Ibid., pp. 407-10. 
32. Trinadtsatyi s”ezd RKP(b): Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1963), pp. 85-
87. 
33. Zinoviev, Zadachi nashei partii, pp. 20-24. 
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that Zinoviev thought of this situation as an anomaly.
34
 When he was accused 
in 1925 of advocacy of independent peasant councils, his fellow leaders seem 
to find the charge plausible.  
In any event, Zinoviev went into detail about the dangers that resulted 
from the party’s “legal monopoly.” It was not so much open careerism that 
was the problem, since careerists could be removed with the relatively blunt 
instrument of the chistka. It was rather the mass, elemental phenomenon of 
the influence of unprepared party members, especially those from the Red 
Army. Zinoviev’s discussion of this problem shows the tension in his out-
look. He continues to praise the new recruits, point to their services, and em-
phasize their sincerity; it is not their fault that they do not know themselves 
and that they bring petty-bourgeois prejudices into the party.
35
  
The party is therefore still faced with a cultural gap between leaders and 
rank-and-file. The low cultural level leads to endless squabbles (skloki), es-
pecially on the local level.
36
 It is also undoubtedly true that decisions are of-
ten handed down ready-made from on high and that there is insufficient “free 
discussion” in the party. Besides objective reasons for this situation, Zinoviev 
granted that inertia from the days of the civil war was a factor.  
Finally, the party’s responsibility to give political direction to the state put 
a tremendous strain on its internal unity. In a speech of January 1924, Zino-
viev listed ten different categories of party membership: factory workers, 
peasants, Red Army officers, students, civil servants, administrators of the 
local soviets, economic officials, trade union officials, “our merchants” and 
officials in the cooperatives.
37
 
Some recently published archival material indicates that Zinoviev was 
genuinely worried about the possibility of the party turning into a “mandarin 
sect.” On August 6, 1923, while vacationing in Kislovodsk, he wrote the fol-
lowing note to Stalin: 
  
In one of the protocols of the Politburo I saw a decision . . . to ease 
the enrollment of the children of high officials into secondary education. 
In my opinion, this decision is a big mistake. It will only make the po-
sition of the children of high officials more difficult. And, most im-
portant, this kind of privilege closes the road to more gifted [applicants] 
and introduces an element of caste. This won’t do.38  
 
                                                 
34. XI s”ezd, pp. 391-94.   
35. Ibid., p. 390. 
36. For a civil-war discussion of skloki, see Vos’moi s”ezd RKP(b), p. 292.  
37. Zinoviev, Zadachi nashei partii, p. 12. 
38. Izvestiia TsK, no. 4 (1991), p. 202. 
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In relation to the other side of the wall, Zinoviev revealed in his speeches 
what appears to be genuine empathy with the difficulties of ordinary individ-
uals and the reasons why they would not always be completely thrilled with 
the party. For example: 
  
I mentioned the Putilov factory [in Petrograd] because not so long ago 
I went through an unpleasant experience there: after the end of one rally 
a young lad about 17 years old with a gloomy expression said to his 
neighbor but obviously so that I would hear it: “Ekh, there’s not one in-
telligent person in Soviet Russia” – clearly trying to say “and you aren’t 
so smart yourself.” When I started asking why he had such a gloomy, 
Schopenhauerian outlook on life already at age 17, it turned out that it 
wasn’t from Schopenhauer at all, but because “I have three unemployed 
at home, I’m the only worker and I can’t provide for them. And what I’m 
usually receiving in the way of culture is next to nothing.” The figure of 
this young lad at the Putilov factory is not something exceptional and we 
have to pay attention to it. If we really have seventeen-year-olds in the 
factories that are subjected to such thoughts, then this is a serious dan-
ger.
39
  
 
As we might expect, Zinoviev’s basic wall-prevention measure was to end 
any “massophobia” (massoboiazn’) in the party and to accelerate workeriza-
tion. An article dated February 15 192 – the beginning of the campaign for 
the Lenin enrollment – provides the fullest account of his hopes, and I will 
summarize it here.
40
  
In the Comintern resolution from 1920 that I cited earlier, Zinoviev had 
looked forward to the time when the party would embrace almost the entire 
working class. After citing this resolution, Zinoviev exultantly claimed “We 
are now, in the USSR, in the most completely evident way, beginning to ap-
proach precisely this final phase. . . . The fragmentation, the de-classing of 
the proletariat is coming to an end.” 
The foundation of the party had always been its “stratum of old, longtime 
[korennye] worker-Bolsheviks.” The new worker members were also heredi-
tary workers, so that the present enrollment was a case of “potential energy 
turning into kinetic.” Everybody in the party should be taught to take for 
granted that they should take their cues (ravniat’sia) from the basic core of 
workers from the factory floor. 
Now that these new members have been enlisted, the party had to aggres-
sively assimilate them (perevarit’). The basic method should be to give them 
                                                 
39. XI s”ezd, pp. 405-06. 
40. This article can be found in Zinoviev, Istoriia RKP(b), pp. 5-21. 
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state responsibilities: to help production through production conferences and 
the like, to assist the local Rabkrin in improving the state apparatus, and to 
strive for influence among the nonparty elements. The new members must 
remember that the standards of the nonparty people have risen, so that the 
basic party mission of acting as leaders has become even more challenging. 
Zinoviev seems confident that the new workers will genuinely improve mat-
ters; he cites the testimony of “our best red directors” that industrial produc-
tion was now finally reviving. 
Zinoviev then went into some other ways to get the most out of workeriza-
tion. There should be a party reorganization to get cells closer to the factory 
floor. Party democracy – especially in the sense of free discussion – should 
be intensified as the basic means of party education. The new workers with 
links to the village should be used to strengthen the smychka. The everyday 
living standard (byt) of the workers should be improved. Finally, massopho-
bia should not be allowed to stand in the way getting even more workers into 
the party: “We must plow the virgin soil ever deeper.”41  
In presenting Zinoviev’s outlook from this period, I have abstracted from 
some dissonant notes that emerged in the struggle against Trotsky. There 
was, for example, more and more of a stress on party unity and the impermis-
sibility of any attack on it. Lenin’s death also made Zinoviev even more 
afraid of splits within the party leadership. The audience response to this 
theme was always foot-stomping approval – far more than to anything else 
Zinoviev says. Zinoviev also takes up the defense of the party apparat as a 
necessary tool in disciplining the state apparat. 
Despite these dissonant notes, I think we can conclude the following: from 
at least 1919 to 1924, despite the end of the civil war and the introduction of 
NEP, Zinoviev presented a consistent picture of the danger of the wall as well 
as some possible antidotes. His main response is to urge the overcoming of 
“massophobia” (his own, perhaps, as well as that of others). Despite the many 
objective reasons for the existence of the wall, the party should strive to 
overcome it for the sake of its own health as well as its need for social sup-
port. Zinoviev was able to give a relatively lucid analysis of the wall and its 
consequences because of his underlying optimism that the party and the class 
(and beyond it, the mass) share an underlying unity of outlook which time 
will only make more clear.  
 
The peasantry: Hegemony and “who-whom” 
In the 1920s, Zinoviev often made a claim that stands in stark contrast to 
conventional wisdom about NEP: he presented it as just another manifesta-
tion of the essence of Bolshevism, namely, the insistence on the mission of 
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the working class to act as hegemonic leader of the peasantry. According to 
Zinoviev, the insistence on this mission was Lenin’s central contribution to 
Marxism and had always separated Bolshevism from its socialist rivals. In 
1924, he cited the newly discovered manuscript of Lenin’s Who are the 
friends of the people from the early 1890s: “The person of the future in Rus-
sia is the worker – this is the thought of the Social Democrats.” He then para-
phrased Lenin’s formula in order to bring out the fundamental idea of he-
gemony: “The person of the future in Russia is the worker, leading the peas-
ant.”42 Thus the smychka of the 1920s is shown to have deep roots in Lenin’s 
earliest writings. 
In this way, Zinoviev fits the peasantry into his own larger story of he-
gemony: just as the party will eventually win over the working class as a 
whole, so will the working class win over the peasantry. The drama of the 
story is heightened, both because the peasants are more backward than the 
workers and because the kulak is a more formidable hegemonic rival than the 
urban bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, Zinoviev’s drama of hegemony in the 1920s 
is basically optimistic, since it is structured by an assumption of a natural 
hostility between the kulak and the majority of the peasantry: “We have unit-
ed with the working peasant against the kulak bloodsucker!”43 When Zino-
viev, Kamenev and Krupskaya protested against what they viewed as a 
whitewash of the kulak in 1925, they did so because they thought it would of-
fend peasants, not party ideologues or urban workers. The smychka thus re-
quired hostility toward the kulak.  
 
Civil war  
By 1920, the revolution had given the peasants land and a countryside free 
from pomeshchiki, but very little else except heavy burdens and a deteriorat-
ing economy. The minimum (and perhaps the maximum) we can expect from 
the Bolsheviks is an honest avowal of these facts. Zinoviev (along with many 
other Bolshevik spokesmen) passes this particular test.
44
 
In early 1920, Zinoviev admitted that although Russia had been in bad 
shape when the Bolsheviks took it over, it was in worse shape now. Yes, the 
peasants had received land. “But you know, the peasant can’t scrape the earth 
with his teeth. The peasant can’t work the land because he has no horses. We 
declared mobilization after mobilization. The village is short of everything 
                                                 
42. Zinoviev, Istoriia RKP(b), p. 208. 
43. G. Zinoviev, Krest’iane i sovetskaia vlast’ (Petrograd: Gosizdat, 1920) (speech given 
April 21, 1920 to a non-party conference in Petrograd guberniia). 
44. In reading the following, keep in mind the entrenched stereotype reflected, for example, 
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from Lenin down, as not merely socialism, but even communism” (Harvest of Sorrow [New 
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necessary.”45 Taking peasants away from the field for two weeks at harvest 
time was “appalling and a real torture. But still – it was unavoidable. . . . 
With a weary heart, we were forced literally to loot half of Russia, but 
achieve victory over the generals.”46  
Added to the material burdens was arbitrary government by representa-
tives of Soviet power. “When I hear specific complaints – here they took 
your horse away, there they made an illegitimate arrest, the special tax was 
improperly levied – then I am amazed, not that such examples [of peasant 
protest] occur, but that they are becoming ever fewer.” Given illiteracy, gen-
eral backwardness, years of being divided from the workers, and the shortage 
of “decent people and officials,” such abuses could not be avoided.47 
These are not isolated statements, or ones made only to peasant audiences.  
In Germany in late 1920, critics cited statements like these by Zinoviev as 
well as Lenin and Preobrazhensky to show how badly the peasants were far-
ing in Russia. Zinoviev responded that yes indeed, he and the others had been 
quoted correctly, but they were doing their best to make things better. Be-
sides, these statements showed that the Bolsheviks weren’t afraid to talk 
about their problems.
48
 
We next inquire whether we can find any doctrinal reflection about the 
importance of maintaining peasant support. We should remember that the 
Bolsheviks were criticized by orthodox socialists such as Karl Kautsky be-
cause they gave too much to the peasants: the break-up of the estates hurt 
large-scale agriculture and helped to entrench a village bourgeoisie. The Bol-
shevik response was to write the necessity of attracting peasant support into 
the “twenty-one conditions” for membership in the Communist International 
– a document drafted by Zinoviev.49  
In his speech in Germany in September 1920, Zinoviev maintained that 
neglect of the peasants was a cardinal reason for Béla Kun’s failure in Hun-
gary, and forecast the necessity for the German revolution to gain the support 
of the seredniak in order to ward off counter revolution. In response to critics 
who said that the break-up of the estates signified a return to the middle ages, 
                                                 
45. Novye zadachi nashei partii (ot voiny k khoziaistvu) (Petersburg: Gosizdat: 1920), p. 11 
(speech given Jan. 28, 1920). 
46. Zinoviev, Krest’iane i sovetskaia vlast’. 
47. Ibid., pp. 45-56 
48. Zinoviev, Dvenadtsat’ dnei v Germanii (Peterburg: Gosizdat, 1920), pp. 66 ff.   
49. Hedlin shows that Zinoviev was the main author of the 21 conditions, despite their attrib-
ution to Lenin in the fifth edition of his works (“Grigorii Zinoviev: Myths of the Defeated”). I 
can add a stylistic observation to Hedlin’s discussion: the presence of the rare word razzhizheniia 
(rarefaction), one that I have run across only in Zinoviev’s writings.  
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Zinoviev retorted that Russia could live five or ten years without socialism in 
the villages, but at least it would never go back to capitalism.
50
 
These statements by Zinoviev support his claim that, even during the peri-
od of so-called war communism, Bolshevism distinguished itself from Men-
shevism and other varieties of socialism by its willingness to attract peasant 
support even at the cost of slowing down the purely economic evolution of 
socialism in the countryside. 
We now turn to Zinoviev’s view of what was going on inside the peasant-
ry. Here “the kulak” can best be understood as a role in the drama of hegem-
ony: the alternative leadership that struggles with the proletariat for influence 
over the swing vote, that is, the wavering mass of the peasantry. There is a 
certain inner contradiction contained within this role in all versions of the he-
gemony story, since the alternative leadership is seen as both the oppressor 
loathed by the masses and the seductive rival with an enormous capacity to 
deceive the same masses.  
This is certainly the case for Zinoviev’s view of the kulak. One the one 
hand, the kulaks are a small handful who “hold the whole village in their te-
nacious clutches.”51 The peasants know who these people are, and ultimately 
it is up to the peasants to deal with them. The kulak is somebody who lives 
“at the expense of others” and thrives on usury, speculation and exploitation 
of labor. Zinoviev is frankly puzzled why the village does not declare open 
season on them and attributes this to village shyness or lack of organization.
52
 
This leads us to the other side of the coin: the threat posed by the kulaks as 
the most entrenched and rooted bourgeois class in Russia. Unlike the urban 
bourgeoisie, they’re not leaving for Constantinople. On the contrary, they 
show great survival power: throw them out of a fifth story window, and they 
land on their feet. Some of them may see the need for a new life, but for the 
most part they remain dangerous enemies even if they don’t take up arms 
(they spread rumors, wriggle into soviets and so forth). This is a long-term 
problem: kulakdom (kulach’e) isn’t going to be extinct for a long time.53 
Zinoviev’s fierce rhetoric about kulaks must be put alongside the evidence 
that he took the worker-peasant union seriously. Perhaps this can best be seen 
by the very fact of the speech I have been citing extensively (Krest’iane i so-
                                                 
50. He quickly added that it would be at least a century before the “full practical realization 
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vetskaia vlast’, given on April 21, 1920) which was given at a “nonparty con-
ference” in Petrograd province. Here Zinoviev went before a peasant audi-
ence, admitted that the revolution had given little but imposed much, pleaded 
that the mutual victory not be spoiled by distrust, and tried to respond to the 
many vocal complaints. He couldn’t understand why people in the audience 
were offended by his attacks on the kulak: “There’s no reason to be offended 
by what I said! . . . If the kulak is offended, that makes sense.  His turn has 
come. But there are no kulaks among you.”54  
Zinoviev’s confidence that deep down the peasants were on the side of the 
Bolsheviks is an extension of the same confidence he expressed in the case of 
the workers. The point of the soviets for both workers and peasants was to 
provide a means of “bringing understanding to our backward brethren.”55  
Conversely the soviet mechanism would only benefit from enlisting peasants 
as well as workers. In 1919 he proposed that VTsIK bring in more peasants: 
“We should see more leaders of the peasant poor there, who have not yet en-
rolled in the party, but who will do so in a month or maybe two.”56   
As this last comment indicates, Zinoviev entered into the world of the 
peasantry from the proletarian door, that is, the bednota. These were the “best 
people” in the village. Zinoviev was inclined not to be harsh about their mis-
takes: wasn’t it time for them to triumph for once? He regarded the seredniak 
somewhat condescendingly and put him in the same category as the “lower 
middle-class intelligentsia” and the urban man-in-the-street (obyvatel’): all 
these groups could and should be won over, but only with time. The task of 
the party was thus to extend its influence in the villages so that it is possible 
to “maintain the vlast [without military force]. To accomplish this will re-
quire a huge amount of work that will occupy a series of years.”57 
 
NEP  
 We now turn to Zinoviev’s presentation of the logic of NEP in the years 
before he went into opposition in 1925. His understanding of it was summed 
up in the repeated phrase kto-kogo. Like most people, I had always thought 
that this phrase was an expression of the hard-line Lenin: “who (oppresses, 
beats, takes advantage of) whom.” It was something of a shock when some 
time ago I tried to track down its actual use by Lenin and found that (as far as 
I can tell) it was entirely confined to the NEP years and only employed to ex-
press the logic of NEP. He used it no more than a couple of times, and I 
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would hazard the guess that Zinoviev’s frequent use of it in 1923-1925 that 
put the phrase into wider circulation.  
As understood by Zinoviev, the phrase means something like this: who 
will gain the loyalty of the peasants: the proletarian state or the new bour-
geoisie? Who will best take advantage of the opportunities presented by eco-
nomic revival? Who will best represent the political interests of the peasant 
and best provide the peasant with goods and credit? Which smychka will pre-
vail: the proletarian or the bourgeois? The answer to these questions will de-
cide the fate of the revolution. 
Thus, kto-kogo turns NEP into an on-going drama. We can best under-
stand the further details of the NEP drama as understood by Zinoviev if we 
take seriously a terminological innovation he proposed in 1923 and 1924: to 
distinguish between “NEP” and the New Economic Policy. “NEP” had been 
turned into a term referring to the nepmen, the new bourgeoisie and the ku-
laks. Its negative connotations should not be transferred to the New Econom-
ic Policy, which was the only sensible policy for constructing socialism in a 
peasant country surrounded by capitalism. (The following discussion uses 
this distinction somewhat more systematically than Zinoviev did, but I am 
sticking closely to Zinoviev’s own presentation of the logic of the New Eco-
nomic Policy.) 
According to Zinoviev, the New Economic Policy did involve a retreat, 
namely, the tolerance of NEP elements (not the concessions to the peasants). 
This retreat was necessary in order to revive the economy under conditions of 
the capitalist encirclement. The retreat was not all the way back to capitalism, 
but only to “state capitalism,” which included such uncapitalist things as a 
state monopoly on foreign trade. Once the economy had revived sufficiently, 
an advance was again possible. This advance would also be conducted under 
the terms of the New Economic Policy: its aim would be to replace the eco-
nomic services provided by the Nepmen with the state’s own superior eco-
nomic structures. Until the advance was successfully completed, the question 
of kto-kogo would still be open. “NEP” could therefore at first be read as the 
Necessary Economic Policy; later, when state economic structures were in 
place, as the Needless Economic Policy.
58
  
In the case of the party’s relation to the workers, degeneration manifested 
itself by an acceptance of the wall. An equivalent degeneration in the case of 
the New Economic Policy would be forgetting about kto-kogo, that is, wel-
coming economic revival in and of itself, no matter where it was leading, and 
in this way refusing the challenge of directing economic development down 
the proper socialist channels. This is the outcome predicted by the clever foe.  
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In his 1924 political report to the 13th party congress, Zinoviev asked two 
questions. The first was “did the state’s economic performance mean that it 
was moving out of the elementary class of economic competence?”  The sec-
ond was kto-kogo. A generally positive answer was given to the first ques-
tion, but Zinoviev emphasized that an unambiguously positive answer could 
not be given to the second question. His speech is sprinkled with warnings 
about the dangers of forgetting about kto-kogo:  
 
We shouldn’t delude ourselves: there is a real danger of degeneration, 
and the danger of a more then proportional growth of the bourgeoisie is 
also real – and of course this bourgeoisie is starting to emerge out of the 
village. This is the reason that we are much less confident and final in 
our response [to questions about the success of kto-kogo]. Here much 
depends precisely on the subjective efforts of our party, and what we 
need to do is not so much to underline the positive aspects but rather to 
show where we need to apply all our strength. The struggle between us 
and “them” (the new bourgeoisie) is just starting.59   
 
Zinoviev did not talk much about the kulaks until 1924; before then, 
“NEP” meant primarily the urban nepmen. Even in 1924, he maintained that 
there was more danger from a revived menshevism (interpreted as the politi-
cal expression of the urban NEP) rather than from the SRs (the political ex-
pression of the village NEP, that is, the kulaks). But we find a familiar theme 
in his insistence that in the long run it would be the SRs who would prove 
most dangerous.
60
 Zinoviev’s views rest on an assumption that he shared with 
others in the party opposition: the new bourgeoisie would eventually find po-
litical representation and expand their influence if the state was unable to 
render it economically superfluous. One might say that Zinoviev and the rest 
were stuck in prewar conceptions, of civil society and underestimated the 
power of their own repression. In contrast, Bukharin was supremely confi-
dent that the kulaks presented no threat, because his model was the wartime 
“state capitalism” that (it seemed to him) was able to co-opt all opposition.  
In his 1924 congress report, Zinoviev also put forth the idea of two possi-
ble deviations on the kulak question: trying to eliminate them by repressive 
means alone vs. denying their existence. He cited reports from the country-
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side that indicated the danger that the kulak would end up supporting the Bol-
sheviks more than the bedniak did. Out of concern for the smychka, the party 
should be aware of peasant criticism on this issue.  
 It is hardly surprising that Zinoviev put heavy emphasis on the worker-
peasant union during 1922-25, and I will not discuss this theme at length. I 
will cite here a few characteristic touches. In 1923, he rebuked the party by 
saying that even Mussolini was doing a better job of linking up with the 
peasants.
61
 In his 1923 correspondence with Stalin, Zinoviev expressed his 
delight in the founding of a peasant international [1923, B, 200].  
In a speech of early 1925, we find some of Zinoviev’s populism.62 In ex-
plaining the new policies of the neo-NEP, he reviewed some statistics on 
peasant poverty and concluded: “We are a government based upon the poor, 
but it is not our desire to perpetuate the poor; we want to improve their lot.” 
Later in the same speech he admitted that “we know that often the nonparty 
peasant knows our decrees, is almost invariably a better husbandman, better 
understands agriculture and sometimes is better educated than our village 
Communists.” Zinoviev is still upset by abuses of power: “The peasant will 
be sure that the bad ‘Communist’ is not all powerful when he feels free to lift 
his voice against him and see justice meted out to him. . . . How, I ask . . . are 
we to get the peasant to feel he has a right to speak up against bad Com-
munists?”   
If he had an answer to his own question, he didn’t give it in this speech.  
 
Opposition in 1925: Flip-flop or continuity? 
My original aim was to carry my analysis forward to the disputes of late 
1925 when Zinoviev and Kamenev went into opposition, but this has proved 
to be quite impossible, since I would have to go into the policies of 1925’s 
neonep, Bukharin’s position, and the various doctrinal disputes that became 
intertwined with the main debate. I will only give the briefest outline of what 
I think was at issue. 
At present, the only full discussion of the debates of 1925 is by E. H. Carr. 
According to him, Zinoviev did a flip-flop on the question of NEP, moving 
from a strong defense of the neonep to a strong critique of NEP in a matter of 
months. With the background provided by this article, the essential con-
sistency of Zinoviev’s position becomes apparent. 
In my view, the essence of the debate was over defeatism vs. complacen-
cy. Bukharin’s main polemical enemy had always been socialists such as 
Kautsky who argued that the Bolshevik revolution was doomed to failure be-
cause conditions in Russia were not ripe for socialism (I call this the maturity 
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(zrelost’) debate). If any Bolshevik talked too much about the difficulties fac-
ing socialist construction in Russia, Bukharin tended to conclude that he or 
she was a defeatist who secretly accepted Kautsky’s argument and had lost 
faith in the possibility of socialism in Russia. In response, Bukharin himself 
tended to glide over the difficulties, and this pushed Zinoviev’s buttons: be-
hind Bukharin he heard the voice of Ustrialov and other clever foes who were 
predicting that the Bolsheviks would come to terms with capitalism, become 
complacent, and gradually forget their revolutionary aspirations.  
Thus it was not the actual policy of neonep that led to Zinoviev’s worries, 
but its interpretation by Bukharin and others. For Zinoviev, it was very im-
portant to see the legalization of various kulak practices as a retreat and to 
keep one’s revolutionary perspective: the kto-kogo question was still an open 
one. Zinoviev had always said it would be a disaster if the bedniak came to 
see the New Economic Policy as a wager on the kulak, and now Bukharin 
with his “get rich” slogan (April 1925) seemed to be going out of his way to 
give exactly that impression. 
A related debate was over the status of state industry: was it “state capital-
ism” or already socialist? Behind the mind-numbing citation-mongering on 
this issue we can perceive Zinoviev’s concern that the party should take seri-
ously the workers’ dissatisfaction with low pay, bad working conditions, and 
abuses by the bosses.  
 
Conclusion 
The most important conclusion to emerge from this material is that Zino-
viev did in fact express a consistent outlook with some degree of intellectual 
and political integrity (given standards appropriate for political leaders). This 
outlook was based on his understanding of Leninism as a drama of hegemo-
ny: a battle with the class enemy for the souls of the masses. Zinoviev was 
especially concerned with the danger of degeneration: would the vanguard 
forget its mission? Would it accept with complacency the wall that inevitably 
sprang up between vanguard and masses? Would it forget about the drama of 
kto-kovo made necessary by concessions to the new bourgeoisie? Indeed, de-
generation itself could even be defined as forgetting that hegemony was a 
drama, that is, a struggle with no sure outcome. I can see no reason to dismiss 
this outlook as mere rhetoric or as motivated by passing factional concerns. 
Zinoviev stuck to it over a number of years, during both the civil war and 
NEP; he consistently put forth policy suggestions based on it; he used it as 
the basis of his platform when he moved into opposition.  
The particular features of Zinoviev’s outlook seem to have been recog-
nized by his comrades in the Bolshevik leadership. For example, in spring 
1919 Zinoviev was the speaker for the Central Committee at the 8
th
 party 
congress on issues of party organization and bureaucratism. He was also the 
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main spokesman on this question at the 9
th
 party conference in September 
1920, when the issue of bureaucratism was at the center of a violent contro-
versy within the party. Zinoviev was also given the job of reporting on this 
issue at the 8
th
 congress of Soviets at the end of 1920. 
Zinoviev’s emphasis on the concept of hegemony makes one think of An-
tonio Gramsci. As a foreign communist, Gramsci would have dealt more with 
Zinoviev than with any other Bolshevik leader and must have been influ-
enced by his particular understanding of Leninism. Certainly it would be sat-
isfyingly ironic if the despised Zinoviev turned out ultimately to have more 
enduring intellectual influence (via his talented pupil Gramsci) than any other 
top Bolshevik.
63
  
I have been stressing some of the relatively attractive features of Zino-
viev’s outlook, since it seems to me that this is the more surprising result of 
my investigation. Lest I seem unbalanced, I should add at least the following. 
Zinoviev had very little concrete to say about the policy dilemmas faced by 
the Bolsheviks except what was revealed by his hegemony scenario. Fur-
thermore, when he went into opposition, all his weaknesses came into play 
and he was never able to make a coherent presentation of his case. His book 
Leninism and his speeches at the 14
th
 party congress and the 15
th
 party con-
ference show him drowning in defensive logic-chopping and citation-mon-
gering. It is mainly (but not entirely!) his own fault that his message had to be 
excavated by obscure academics many decades later.  
There is nevertheless something refreshing about Zinoviev’s outlook, 
symbolized by the occasional presence in his speeches of the hungry mother 
and the Schopenhaurian teenager. To some extent, perhaps, this is just a rhe-
torical device – but if so, it is a refreshing one after the faceless abstractions 
that dominate the writings and speeches of other top Bolshevik leaders. My 
impression is that Zinoviev was genuinely concerned about the problems 
faced by ordinary people. 
One reason that I undertook this research was skepticism about received 
understandings of “War Communism” and NEP. I have not stressed this as-
pect in the present essay, but I will make a couple of observations. Some of 
the things Zinoviev said during 1920 – especially about the problems of bu-
reaucratism and the burdens placed on the peasantry – are simply not compat-
ible with the standard stereotype of “war communism” as the sanctification of 
wartime expedients into a permanent system. In a less direct way, my Zino-
viev material presents problems for typical interpretations of NEP. There is 
first simply the consistency I have shown in Zinoviev’s outlook: he was able 
to defend NEP by making the same kind of arguments that he made during 
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the civil war.
64
 Zinoviev’s own understanding of NEP as typically Bolshevik 
also stands as a challenge to conventional views. Finally, his understanding 
of the retreat/advance metaphor shows that the “advance” was not meant as a 
return to “war communism” or a Stalin-style assault on the peasantry. (In 
none of this is Zinoviev unique – he is simply another anomaly confronting 
the standard stereotypes.)  
The main purpose of this essay has been to complicate our understanding 
of the early years of Soviet power by presenting one authoritative and rela-
tively populist rendering of the “essence of Bolshevism.” 
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